Semantics of Clausal Embedding

Attitude verbs have been traditionally thought of as lexical items introducing modal displacement: the ability of language to not only talk about here and now, but to shift evaluation of propositions to other times and other possible situations. For example, Nadya believes [that the squirrel ate the peanuts] shifts the evaluation of the proposition the squirrel ate the peanuts to situations compatible with Nadya’s beliefs. The big question that emerges from such constructions is this: How does natural language achieve modal displacement of embedded propositions, how does it relate to entailment properties of constructions with embedded clauses, and what is the division of labor between the clause-embedding verb, and the different syntactic elements in the left peripheries of embedded clauses? In my work, I argue that, contra the traditional view, the source of modal displacement is inside the embedded clause. I investigate the meanings of elements in the left peripheries of embedded clauses, and argue that they give rise to a number of restrictions on clausal embedding. This approach requires us to rethink, among other things, how to model monotonicity in attitude reports, verbal mood, and interrogative embedding.